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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper provides one potential  explanation for the rise, persistence and eventual 
fall of internet stock prices. Specifically, we appeal to a model of heterogenous agents 
with varying degrees of beliefs about asset payoffs who are subject to short sales 
constraints. In this framework, it is possible that “optimistic” investors overwhelm 
“pessimistic” ones, leading to prices not reflecting fundamental values about cash flows 
summarized by aggregate beliefs. Empirical support for this explanation is provided by 
exploring the behavior of internet stock prices during the period January 1998 to 
November 2000. In particular, we document four important elements to our story: (i) the 
high level of internet stock prices given their underlying fundamentals, (ii) responses of 
stock prices to a shift towards potentially optimistic investors, (iii) empirical results 
consistent with shorting being at its maximum possible level for internet stocks, and (iv) 
the eventual fall, or bubble bursting, of internet stocks being tied to the increase in the 
number of sellers to the market via expiration of lockup agreements. 
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I.  Introduction 
 
By February 2000, the internet sector equaled 6% of the market capitalization of all 
U.S. public companies and 20% of all publicly trade equity volume. Moreover, in just a 
two-year period of time, the entire sector earned over 1000% returns on their public 
equity. This paper provides a new look at the behavior of stock prices in this sector. In 
particular, we develop a cohesive explanation of the rise, persistence and then subsequent 
fall of internet stock prices. 
 Of particular interest is the question of how the mispricing of internet stocks could 
persist in the presence of well-funded, rational investors. We provide an analysis based 
on Lintner’s (1969) model of asset prices with investors having heterogenous beliefs and 
facing short sale restrictions. For Lintner’s model to produce “bubble-like” behavior in 
asset prices, two conditions are necessary: (i) heterogeneity in beliefs, and (ii) short sale 
restrictions for the pessimistic investors. In his framework, asset prices are a weighted 
average of beliefs about asset payoffs with the weights being determined by the 
investor’s risk aversion and beliefs about asset price covariances. While the asset prices 
are equilibrium-determined to the extent that they reflect the underlying beliefs about 
payoffs, short sale restrictions force the pessimistic investors out of the market, leaving 
only optimistic investors left and thus inflated asset price levels.1 
There are four elements required to give empirical support for this explanation: (i) 
were internet firms overvalued?, (ii) if so, were the marginal investors of these stocks 
overly optimistic?, (iii) why did pessimistic investors not push internet prices back to 
fundamental levels?, and (iv) within this framework, what type of conditions could 
eventually lead to the eventual collapse of internet prices? This paper posits an answer to 
each of these questions and provides corresponding empirical support. 
First, we investigate whether internet stock prices were too high relative to traditional 
valuation metrics. Specifically, we use an implied price/earnings measure to generate the 
necessary excess returns on capital or growth rates in earnings to justify the internet stock 
                                               
1 There is a long history in the finance literature of developing the equilibrium implications of short sales 
restrictions, e.g., see Lintner (1969), Miller (1977), Jarrow (1981), Detemple and Murthy (1997), and, more 
recently, Basak and Croitoru (2000) , Chen, Hong and Stein (2000), and Jones and Lamont (2001), among 
others. 
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price levels. In general, across entire sectors of the internet economy, these 
returns/growth rates are far in excess of any values previously documented (even for the 
ex post most successful firms in other industries). 
Second, we explore two examples of shifts in the heterogeneity of investors. The first 
example documents the holders of internet stocks and shows that, by in large, a much 
greater fraction are retail investors relative to holders of non-internet stocks. The second 
example explores what happens to internet stock prices when there is a shift in the 
distribution of investors, i.e., optimistic ones entering the market. To gather evidence on 
this latter topic, we look at a far-reaching event, which affect all firms, related to the  
IPO: (i) the first day, and (ii) the quiet period. Using these events illustratively, we argue 
here that there is a link between asset price behavior and the beliefs of these agents being 
overly optimistic. 
Third, why didn’t “realistic” investors come into the market and drive prices back 
down to fundamental levels?  One particular explanation is that even though there might 
have been plenty of capital available for rational trading, the market had limited ability to 
short internet stocks. We show evidence via (i) short interest, and (ii) the rebate rate on 
shorts, that there were significant short positions in internet stocks relative to “old 
economy” stocks with indirect evidence of it being difficult to accumulate additional 
short positions. That is, pessimistic traders were trying to bring markets back to 
reasonable price levels, but they were being overrun by the size and volume of optimistic 
trading. 
Fourth, what caused the so-called internet bubble to burst? We offer a potential 
explanation consistent with the Lintner model that does not require a shift in the beliefs 
(at least initially) of the optimistic investor. During the Spring and latter half of 2000, an 
extraordinary number of lock-ups expired. Though there is evidence that the constraint 
against shorting these stocks was binding, these lock-up expirations added a significant 
number of new investors to the market.  If a fraction of these investors were either 
agnostic or pessimistic, then these “realistic” beliefs would get incorporated into asset 
prices. We present evidence consistent with this explanation. 
 
II. The Story 
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Figure 1 graphs the index of an equally-weighted portfolio of the internet stocks over 
the sample period January 1998 to December 2000 versus the S&P500 and NASDAQ 
indices over this same period. While this graph is not evidence of mispricing per se, there 
was a substantial divergence between the relative pricing of internet stocks and the broad 
market as a whole. 
There are three interesting questions related to the level of internet stock prices: (i) 
why did the prices get high in the first place?, (ii) why did they continue to be high in the 
presence of rational, well-funded investors?, and (iii) why did the stock prices of these 
firms eventually fall? Unfortunately, these are questions that we are not going to be able 
to answer definitively. Nevertheless, in this and later sections, we provide one potential 
theoretical explanation for (i) – (iii), and then derive and empirically analyze implications 
of the model. In particular, we appeal to Lintner’s (1969) model of asset price formation. 
Two important features of the model are necessary to generate the appropriate story. 
First, investors must have significant heterogeneity of their beliefs about asset price 
payoffs, so that prices (without trading restrictions) reflect a weighted combination of 
these diverse views. Second, the more pessimistic investors are restricted from selling 
(i.e., shorting) the stocks so that their beliefs do not get impounded in prices. 
Note that Lintner’s (1969) paper also addressed the issue of short sales constraints 
and our results mirror his. Similar papers working off the Lintner framework which 
provide similar (albeit more detailed) results include Miller (1977), Jarrow (1980) and 
Figlewski (1981), among others. Recently, Chen, Hong and Stein (2000) also develop a  
model in which  rational investors cannot short stocks such that they can only decide to 
not participate in the market. With enough irrational traders, stocks can be overpriced, 
which will be similar to our model’s results below (see also Jones and Lamont (2001)). 
Their results are applied from the perspective of short sales restrictions on mutual funds. 
Also, Lamont and Thaler (2000) and Mitchell, Pulvino and Stafford (2001) make a 
similar point in the context of looking at mispricing and arbitrage with respect to equity 
carve-outs. Dynamic general equilibrium models have been developed by Detemple and 
Murthy (1997) and Basak and and Croitoru (2000) who show that with heterogenous 
investors prices of redundant assets can deviate in equilibrium under portfolio constraints. 
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Suppose there are M investors, each with constant absolute risk aversion utility 
indexed by parameter aj and different beliefs about the distribution of asset payoffs. The 
beliefs about the payoff of the N assets are the normal distribution with mean mj and 
variance-covariance matrix W j. We assume that there exists a riskless asset available for 
holding or borrowing at a fixed, exogenously determined rate r0 with numeraire price, 
P0=1. Assume further that the risky assets exist in fixed quantity, one each, which are 
spread across the endowments of the M investors. 
This model is a convenient way to approximate the overall framework that many 
academics and practitioners feel appropriate for the internet sector. That is, the model 
allows for investors who have “optimistic” beliefs about the payoffs of internet stocks 
(i.e., high mj) as well as unwise beliefs about the level of risk (i.e., low |W j|).2 Similarly, 
on the other side, the model allows for pessimistic investors in terms of both means and 
variances of asset payoffs. Why would investors have optimistic beliefs about internet 
stock prices? The internet-related industries in general were very new with little or no 
past history to guide investors. One possible reason for optimism might be that individual 
investors believed the hype about the internet and transferred those beliefs into asset 
prices, ignoring information about cash flows. While we have no concrete evidence for 
this point, below we will show evidence of heterogeneity amongst investors and 
seemingly optimistic behavior on at least some of these investors’ part. 
The behavior may not be strictly irrational since the optimism could  fit the theory of 
rational bubbles (e.g., Blanchard and Watson (1982) and Froot and Obstfeld (1991)). 
Rational bubbles occur when investors satisfy their first order conditions from their 
consumption and investment decision, yet asset prices do not reflect their fundamental 
values, i.e., the discounted value of expected future cash flows. This is because today’s 
price also reflects the discounted value of the future price (possibly way in the distant 
future) which may not equal its fundamental value. The intuition is that, even though 
asset prices lie above their fundamental values, investors still value the asset highly 
                                                
2 By  “optimistic”, we generally mean unrealistic beliefs about future payoffs of the assets. The static nature 
of the here model aside, we ignore for the moment the question of  whether the “optimistic” beliefs are 
about future prices independent of cash flows (i.e., a bubble), or about the prospect of future cash flows 
(i.e., fundamentals). In this paper, when we refer to fundamentals, we generally mean aggregate beliefs 
about future cash flows/discount rates in the absence of any selling restrictions. 
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because of the possibility of even higher prices in the future. Of course, through iteration, 
this implies some possibility of an infinite price in the future.  This and other reasons has 
led many researchers to question the theoretical viability of rational bubbles (e.g., Diba 
and Grossman (1988), Santos and Woodford (1997) and Cochrane (2001)). Nevertheless, 
by making the bubbles somewhat less than fully rational (e.g., Brunnermeier (2001)), the 
high internet prices are consistent with the idea of high future internet stock prices not 
tied to fundamental values. Unfortunately, because this future price is by nature never 
observed in our sample, the empirical content is vacuous. 
This point aside, in this paper, we do not distinguish between high prices due to over-
optimistic beliefs about future cash flows (i.e., fundamentals) versus a “bubble” belief 
about even higher future prices. While it is clear that once a bubble is in place, rational 
investors may find it worthwhile to purchase stocks (i.e., the “greater fools” theory), our 
analysis focuses on investors who may not have held these beliefs. In particular, why, in a 
heterogenous world, did pessimistic (or ex post smart) investors not help deflate internet 
prices?3 The Lintner model is a convenient way to investigate this question. 
Working through Lintner’s model, each investor’s demand for the risky assets can be 
written as 
(1)                             )(
1
0
1 Prq jj
j
j -W= - ma
 
where the underbar represents a vector, q is the demand and P the prices of the assets. 
Summing over all the individual demands, and equating demand and supply of the risky 
assets, yields the equilibrium prices of the assets: 
(2)           1
1 1
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
÷÷ø
ö
ççè
æ
-W÷÷ø
ö
ççè
æ
W= -
=
-
-
=
åå jj
M
j
j
M
j
jjr
P maa  
In this model, prices are a weighted average of the beliefs about asset payoffs, the 
weights being determined by the investor’s individual risk aversion and beliefs about the 
variance-covariance matrix of the payoffs. Intuitively, the more risk averse an individual 
is (i.e., high a) or stronger believer in risk either through the variance or correlation 
                                                
3 There is an even deeper question about whether irrational investors can persist in equilibrium, that is, 
whether natural selection takes place. The debate continues and is beyond the scope of this paper (e.g.,   see 
the different conclusions in DeLong, Shleifer, Summers and Waldmann (1990) versus Sandroni (2000)). 
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pattern of asset payoffs (i.e., high |W |), then the less weight his/her beliefs about the 
payoffs has on asset prices. Moreover, the more significant a representation one has in the 
investor pool (i.e., large fraction of M), then one’s beliefs are more imposed on prices. 
 Plugging equation (2) back into equation (1) gives the optimal holdings of each 
investor: 
(3)           1(
1 1
1
1
1
1
1
11
÷÷ø
ö
ççè
æ
-W÷÷ø
ö
ççè
æ
W-W= -
=
-
-
=
- åå jj
M
j
j
M
j
jj
j
j jj
q mm
a aa
 
Several observations about this model are in order. First, if one views usual 
circumstances as one in which investors have homogenous beliefs, or at least the ones 
that matter for trading (i.e., high fraction of M), then equation (3) reduces to the well-
known two-fund separation result of the CAPM. That is,  
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That is, each investor holds a linear share of the market portfolio, the share depending on 
his/her aversion to risk. The other holding is in the risk free asset. One might argue that 
this is the norm when investors were not subject to the “optimism” of the internet market. 
Second, when beliefs diverge, this result no longer holds as each individual investor 
holds some combination of his/her own beliefs about payoffs adjusted for the market’s 
aggregate beliefs. If mj is low enough for asset n, it is clear from equation (3) that the 
investor will short asset n, with the other investors holding more long positions in the 
asset in equilibrium.4 In terms of the internet setting, one could loosely view equation (3) 
in terms of “pessimistic” investors shorting internet stocks, with “optimistic” investors 
simultaneously going aggressively long in these same stocks. Third, this model can be 
used to discuss the implications of short sale restrictions. In particular, one could impose 
the restriction that qj must be greater than –q*, where q* is the maximum level of short 
positions across the n assets for any individual j. Of course, the extreme restriction would 
be that q*=0, i.e., no short sales allowed. One could imagine that some investors might 
face tougher restrictions than others, so that q* might vary across investors. 
                                                
4 Equilibrium here is defined in a fairly antiquated way as the model is static and agents do not have 
rational expectations. That is, their beliefs are set and all other information (such as current prices) is 
ignored. 
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 As pessimistic investors wish to short the stock more than q*, the constraint is 
binding and investors either stay at q* or even short less, depending on the variance-
covariance matrix W . In either case, their beliefs will have less of an impact on asset 
prices, as the market clearing price no longer reflects the optimal short position, and puts 
more weight on the optimistic view of payoffs. Consider the extreme case in which the 
pessimistic investors actually leave the market and hold no stocks. In this case, asset 
prices will reflect only the beliefs of the optimistic investors and therefore increase as a 
result. The pessimistic investors would like to short the stocks at these inflated prices, 
thus bringing them down in value, but are prevented from doing so due to the short sales 
restrictions. This is the exact result documented in Miller (1977) and Jarrow (1980), and 
empirically investigated in Figlewski (1981) and Jones and Lamont (2001). 
 Within the framework of the model, there are three main sources of uncertainty 
driving stock prices: (i) shocks to beliefs about asset payoffs (mj), (ii) shocks to 
preferences (aj), and (iii) shocks to either the relevant fraction of or to the number of 
investors (M), and/or shocks to the short constraint q*. This latter source of uncertainty is 
only relevant in the presence of substantive heterogeneity in beliefs about asset payoffs, 
and thus may be particularly unique to the internet sector. 
 We believe this model’s intuition conveys a reasonable story for the so-called 
internet bubble. On the one hand, there were many optimistic investors arriving to the 
market willing to pay high prices for internet stocks; on the other hand, some pessimistic 
investors were willing to short these stocks at the high prices. However, because the 
amount of shorting is limited in practice, the pessimistic investors’ beliefs got 
overwhelmed by the optimistic beliefs, leading to the high valuation of internet stocks.  
 
III.  Data 
 
Some version of our basic story for how stocks can be overvalued has been 
circulating the finance literature for over thirty years in some form or another. It is an 
empirical question whether this explanation applies to the internet sector. As such, this 
paper studies various characteristics of internet-related companies over the period 
January 1, 1998 to February 29, 2000. 
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 There is no strict definition of what constitutes an internet-related firm as a number 
of firms, especially in the technology sector, could perform both “old economy” and 
internet-related functions. For the past few years, Morgan Stanley has published a 
summary of the price and financing characteristics of the various internet sectors – (i) 
portals, (ii) infrastructure companies, (ii) infrastructure services, (iv) software, (v) 
commerce, (vi) consulting and applications, (vii) financial services, (viii) multi-sector, 
(ix) vertical portals, (x) marketing and advertising services, and (xi) B2B commerce.5 For 
want of a better definition, we follow this breakdown, which yields a total of 400 
companies in pure internet-related sectors. Table 1A gives a further breakdown of these 
400 companies by internet sector and “old economy” counterpart industry.6 
Table 1B provides some descriptive statistics about this sample of internet firms 
versus the universe of firms. Several observations are of interest. First, the majority of 
these firms went public during 1999 and the first quarter of 2000. While the short time 
frame can make it more difficult to conduct inference across certain events, it does make 
it easier to avoid concerns about stationarity across sample periods and so forth. Second, 
the price characteristics of this sample of firms suggests that price discreteness – a 
common source of econometric bias – will not be an issue. The average price is $56, 
which is in the high range of the overall sample of firms. Third, the average market value 
of the internet sample relative to the universe of non-internet firms is comparable. Thus, 
from a casual viewpoint, large differences between these samples are probably not due to 
one of the usual culprits in finance, i.e., firm equity size. 
 Fourth, Table 1B provides summary statistics for the mean and volatility of returns 
during the sample. As can be seen from these numbers, both the ex post mean and 
volatility were extremely high during the period for the internet versus non-internet 
sample. For example, the median volatility of internet firm returns is 7.3% on a daily 
basis (or 115.1% annualized) versus 3.0% for the non-internet sample. Moreover, 
microstructure explanations of these volatility differences seem less likely as bid-ask 
                                                
5 The criteria for a company to be included is that it must be considered a pure internet company. This 
means that technology companies like Cisco,  Microsoft and telecommunication firms, with extensive 
internet-related businesses, are excluded. 
6 Note that throughout the paper, the number of firms that qualify for each analysis varies due to such items 
as minimum days needed, whether the firm was public, etc…  Each table identifies the exact number of 
firms used in each analysis. 
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spread measures tend to be lower for the internet stocks. That is, explanations based on 
volatility being driven by private information rather than noise would not find the bid-ask 
results helpful (e.g., Glosten and Milgrom (1985), Glosten and Harris (1990), and Black 
(1986)). 
Finally, Table 1B reports both the median daily volume and share turnover for these 
firms. These measures suggest an active, liquid market for the internet stocks during the 
sample. In fact, relative to the universe of firms, the average volume per stock is three 
times higher for internet firms. As seen from Figures 2 and 3, while internet firms 
represent 6% of the public equity market  during February 2000, the pure internet sector 
represents 19% of the daily volume. Figures 2 and 3 provide an analogous graph to 
Figure 1’s stock price history by showing the time-series of volume in the internet sector. 
The magnitude of this volume is even more surprising given that a significant number of 
shares were not allowed to trade during the lockup period following these firms’ IPOs. In 
addition, depending on the metric, share turnover is between two to four times higher for 
internet firms. 
 These stylized facts about volume have several important implications for the market 
for internet stocks. First, the traded prices of internet stocks were real. That is, large 
volume could be, and, in fact, was executed at these prices. Thus, any rational 
explanation needs to take account of this important fact. Second, the large volume at 
these price levels suggests that there were many investors in this market. While it is 
theoretically possible that the volume was driven by just a few investors trading amongst 
each other, there is anecdotal evidence in the press (regarding the aggregate market) that 
this period had a greater number of participants than ever before. The large volume is 
consistent with this evidence. Third, there is evidence to suggest that the internet sector 
was more prone to retail than institutional investing at least relative to non-internet firms 
(see Table 4). Using points two and three above, it can be argued, at least 
circumstantially, that a considerable number of new and less sophisticated (i.e., retail) 
investors were trading internet stocks. The magnitude of the volume suggests this may 
have been at unparalleled levels. 
 
IV. Were Internet-Related Stock Prices Too High? 
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The extraordinary rise in internet values as shown in Figure 1 has generally been 
called the “internet bubble”. The fact that prices fell in March of that year, and continued 
to fall throughout 2000, gave some credibility to this designation. However, one cannot 
infer necessarily from this ex post realization that market values did not in fact reflect 
fundamental values about cash flows. Tautologically, changing expectations about cash 
flows or discount rates, coupled with realization of various internet fundamentals, could 
also explain the rise and drop in prices. We, as well as anyone else, will not be able to 
definitively answer this question here. Instead, we follow a long line of previous 
academic research (e.g., French and Poterba (1991) and Shiller (2000), among others) to 
provide the reader with an understanding of what the market had to expect to justify such 
high valuations. 
French and Poterba (1991) use Miller and Modigliani’s (1961) model for stock 
valuation to investigate the level of Japanese equity prices in the 1980s. The model is a 
convenient way to look at equity prices because it provides the reader with a way to 
gauge the growth rate required to justify the level and movement in P/E ratios over time. 
In particular, Miller and Modigliani show, that for a firm with supernormal return 
opportunities r* over T periods, 
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where k is the fraction of earnings invested in the supernormal projects and r is the 
discount rate. Now consider the internet sector and further assume that for the first T 
periods these firms earn supernormal return r* with a fraction k=1 invested; after this 
initial period, these firms act like their “old economy” counterparts and achieve similar 
P/E ratios.  In this case, it is possible to show that equation (4) can be rewritten as 
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A nice property of equation (5) is that, as long as we are willing to make an assumption 
about these firm’s long-run P/E ratios, we can estimate how large the supernormal returns 
have to be on current investments relative to required returns in order to justify current 
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P/E levels. In other words, we do not need to know the magnitude of discount rates. 
Equation (5) will form the basis for our analysis to follow. 
We calculate the aggregate earnings of each of the internet sectors using Compustat. 
Even though these companies are public, many of them are startups and have negative 
earnings, so that even the aggregate earnings number is negative. This is due to 
significant costs in building the business, both from a technological point of view and 
from extensive marketing and sales costs. As a result, we consider a different measure of 
earnings potential by backing out the implicit earnings of the sector assuming that the 
companies in the sector have already achieved income margins of their industry 
counterparts.7 For example, in the ecommerce sector, we ignore the fact that the 
companies are unprofitable. Instead, given their revenue and the income margins seen in 
the retailing sector, we assume that the ecommerce sector has already reached the same 
level of profitability. 
Several observations are in order. First, the above assumption about profitability is 
clearly a “best-case” scenario for the internet sectors. In fact, many of their business 
models assume that, after some period of time, the scale of their operations will be so 
large that the added marketing and technological costs of being an internet company are 
swamped and “old economy” margins will be realized.8 Second, by accelerating the 
profitability of the sectors, and essentially assuming that they have reached this stage 
with probability one, the P/Es will be understated, resulting in a corresponding 
underestimate of what the necessary supernormal returns must be.  Third, we estimate the 
P/E ratio by taking the particular internet sector’s aggregate market value of equity 
divided by its implicit earnings.9 These earnings are calculated by multiplying its 
aggregate revenues by the assumed income margin. The assumed income margin is the 
weighted average margin of its closest “old economy”  counterpart. 
                                                
7 One could take the view that this is equivalent to not treating some of the business costs as expenses, but 
instead capitalizing them. We thank Stew Myers for this obervation. 
8 There are clearly some types of internet business models in which the goal is to surpass their old economy 
counterpart’s margins. We ignore these except to point out that earnings move one-to-one with margin 
increases. The interested reader can, therefore, adjust the P/E ratios according to his/her beliefs. 
9 The market value of equity here most likely underestimates the value of the firm. This is due to the fact 
that internet companies have considerable amounts of stock options which do not get capitalized until the 
options are exercised. 
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 Table 2 reports this information for the eleven sectors described in Table 1B. For 
example, industry code 5, the ecommerce sector, includes 50 companies with an 
aggregate market capitalization as of February 2000 of 72.675 billion dollars and with 
aggregate revenues of 4.459 billion and net income of minus 3.565 billion. Using the 
industry margins of 1.9%, we can back out implied earnings of 85 million, which gives 
the industry an implied, new economy P/E ratio of 856. Given an assumption about the 
old economy P/E ratio and the number of years excess returns can be achieved, Equation 
5 can then be used to generate how large these returns must be to justify the 856 level.  
The results in Table 2 correspond to the eleven internet sectors in aggregate; it is also 
of interest to document the implied P/Es firm by firm. Figure 4 graphs the distribution of 
these P/Es across the entire sample of internet-related firms. As seen from the figure, the 
vast majority of the P/Es seem high relative to the types of P/Es usually represented by 
firms (e.g., Shiller (2000)). For example, almost 20% of the firms have P/E ratios in 
excess of 1500, while over 50% exceed 500. This seems especially large given that the 
implied P/Es are derived from the revenue streams of these firms rather than their 
earnings.  
In order to better understand the implications of these P/E numbers, Table 3A 
documents the relative size of supernormal returns, (1+ r*)/(1+r)-1, needed to justify the 
aggregate P/E ratio of the entire internet sector under various assumptions about long-run 
P/E ratios and the time period over which firms can achieve supernormal returns. For an 
historically high P/E ratio of 20, the internet sector would need to generate 40.6% excess 
returns for a 10-year period to justify its current implied P/E ratio of 605. Under the 
strong assumption that all earnings get reinvested, and even if these opportunities lasted 
30 years, excess returns for the entire internet sector still need to be 12.0%. Given Figure 
4, and using the fact that 25% of the firms have P/Es of 1000, this implies that 25% of the 
firms need 47.9% excess returns on capital over a 10-year period. 
An alternative way of writing equation (5), and in the more familiar framework of 
earnings growth rates, it naturally follows that: 
                                    (6)                            
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where g is the growth rate in earnings (assuming all earnings get reinvested). The 
intuition of equation (6) is that the drop in P/Es from today to the target P/E must reflect 
the fact that earnings grow at a much higher rate than expected returns (i.e., the cost of 
capital).  
Assuming a cost of capital of 0%, i.e., zero expected returns over the next few 
decades, the results previously described in Table 3A correspond to the required growth 
in earnings. Thus, even if investors required no return on the internet sector, earnings 
growth would have to range between 12.0% (for 30 years) to 40.6% (for 10 years) at a 
target P/E of 20. How large is 40.6% for 10 years? Chan, Karceski and Lakonishok 
(2001) report the distribution of earnings growth over a 10-year period from 1951-1998 
for both all firms and the two largest deciles.10 At the most extreme distribution tail they 
report (i.e., at 98%), the growth rates are 31.3% and 22.6%, respectively.  Thus, our 
results are extraordinary for several reasons: (i) the required growth rates are between 50-
100% higher than the highest 2% of existing firms, (ii) the growth rates reflect an entire 
sector, not just the ex post performance of the very best firms, and (iii) these growth rates 
imply a cost of capital of 0%. 
At a more reasonable cost of capital, Table 3B provides the various growth rates in 
equation (6) needed to justify P/Es between 10 and 30 over different time periods. For 
example, at a  weighted average cost of capital of 16%, these excess returns translate to 
63.1% growth rate in their implied earnings. This is as much as three times higher than 
the top 2% earnings performers from the Chan, Karceski and Lakonsihok sample. Even 
with a long-run P/E ratio of 30, and thirty years of supernormal returns, the growth rate 
required is still as high as 28.2%. 
This analysis  is not the first to point out the excessive P/E ratios in the stock market 
during this period (e.g., Demers and Lev (2000) and Shiller (2000)). Beyond the financial 
press at large, Shiller (2000), for example, shows that the P/E ratios for the aggregate 
market were at their highest value of any period in the 20th century, including the 
infamous market crash of 1929 and the “nifty-fifty” of the late 60’s. Moreover, we have 
focused on the internet sector and shown that these P/E ratios were much higher than the 
                                                
10 As Chan, Karceski and Lakonishok (2001) point out, their sample is subject to survivorship bias. In 
particular, their numbers are biased upwards as their sample reflects the more successful firms. 
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aggregate markets’.  In fact, putting the “best-case” scenario assumptions aside, the 
results of Table 3 imply that, for a significant period of time, the market would have to 
expect excess returns on their investments of 30-40% above their cost of capital. That is, 
in a competitive product market with few barriers to entry, and across over 400 public 
firms representing 6% of the public market capitalization, expected continual, aggregate 
profits of this magnitude would appear extraordinary. At the minimum, this represents 
strong circumstantial evidence of investors being optimistic about the future growth 
opportunities of this sector. 
Aside from optimism, what else can explain these excess returns on capital? 
One unique characteristic about internet-related firms during this period is that they 
tended to go public relatively soon after incorporation. One possibility is that the large 
implied excess returns on capital for internet firms reflects the firm’s age rather than an 
overvaluation argument. This explanation requires the condition that P/E ratios should 
decline very rapidly as a firm develops. Since most economist’s intuition on what is a 
reasonable excess return on capital derives from experience with old economy 
companies, it seems worthwhile exploring the possibility that firm age plays an important 
role. Table 7B reports cross-sectional correlations of various measures of the sample of 
internet firms, including the implied P/E of each firm and its age. Though the relation is 
negative, i.e., younger firms have higher P/Es, it is barely so, yielding a correlation of 
0.09. Thus, less than 1% of the cross-sectional variation in P/Es can be explained by the 
firm’s age. Moreover, this correlation estimate is also not significant from a statistical 
point of view. 
The other related possibility is that today’s revenues (and implied earnings measures) 
are not representative of the future potential of these firms. That is, the valuation relation 
in equation (2) is not a good approximation in practice. In fact, recent work by Schwartz 
and Moon (2000) argues that internet companies have so many strategic/real options 
available to them that standard discounted cash flow-based models are no longer 
appropriate. However, it is important to point out that these options eventually must 
translate into revenue streams that reflect the growth rates documented above. 
 
V. Heterogeneity and Price Effects 
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The results of Section 4 are consistent with (though not proof of) overvaluation in the 
internet sector. The explanation put forward in Section 2 argues that mispricing of this 
sort could be driven by overoptimism on the part of some investors while simultaneously 
having pessimistic (arguably rational) investors restricted from selling shares (for 
whatever reason) in the market. In this section, we try and provide some empirical 
support for this implication by investigating shifts in the heterogeneity of investors and 
the corresponding price effects. 
While we do not have direct evidence on who was trading, it is possible to document 
who was holding internet stocks. There is anecdotal evidence that there were many more 
participants in the internet-related equity markets than previous periods (see Figures 2 
and 3). Table 4A documents that, on a relative basis compared to non-internet stocks, 
these participants were retail investors rather than institutions. For example, in March 
2000, the median holding of institutions for internet stocks was only 25.9% versus 40.2% 
for non-internet stocks. These differences are strongly significant from a statistical point 
of view. While these differences drop if the sample is restricted solely to IPOs (i.e., from 
15.1% to 7.4%), they are still significant statistically. The differences here are most 
probably understated. An investigation of Morningstar’s database for this period shows 
that a number of internet-based mutual funds started in 1999 and early 2000. Though 
these are measured as institutional holdings, it is clear that the funds themselves are 
simply pass-throughs to retail investors. That is, the creation of internet mutual funds was 
not necessarily due to an institutional view of internet valuations, but more demand 
driven from retail investors. 
If more retail investors were in the market than under normal conditions, then one 
might reasonably argue that the market was more prone to the types of behavioral biases 
that lead to overly optimistic beliefs. Recent work supports this view of retail investors 
(e.g., Barber and Odean (2000, 2001)). As complementary evidence of a typical 
institution’s view of the internet, Table 4B reports the internet versus non-internet 
holdings of the largest pension funds as of March, 2000. Though the internet weight in 
the aggregate market is 4.38%, the holdings of pension funds are under-weighted in the 
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internet sector, representing only 2.3%.11 This is consistent with Chen, Hong and Stein 
(2000) who argue that overvalued firms will have lower breadth of institutional 
ownership.  
 
A.     The IPO – the first day 
 
The above evidence suggests that there was considerable volume in internet stocks 
and that this volume was tied to retail investors.  Suppose for the moment that retail 
investors tended to be more optimistic than institutional ones, based on either hard 
evidence of their holdings or cursory evidence on their behavior (e.g., Barber and Odean 
(2001)). This point, however, does not necessarily imply that the optimistic retail 
investors were the marginal investors relevant for pricing securities. In order to 
investigate this point more closely, we turn to a far-reaching event that all public 
companies have gone through, namely their initial public offering (IPO). The IPO of an 
internet company represents the first time the public-at-large can purchase shares in the 
company. Thus, the first day trading of the IPO represents the first time the price reflects 
the distribution of the beliefs across investors. If internet stocks are more subject to 
overoptimistic investors as we have argued, then the IPO process is highly susceptible to 
a shift in the optimism of beliefs about asset payoffs.  
During the 1998-2000 period, the initial public offering (IPO) of an internet firm was 
arguably the most important event in the firm’s history. This interest was not just 
internally felt, but was also emphasized by the media as well as the individual investor. 
For example, numerous financial websites were created that carried information relevant 
for internet IPOs such as IPO.com, IPOtr acker.com, IPOlockup.com, and 
IPOcentral.com, among many others. Moreover, the standard financial websites included 
detailed analysis of both upcoming and past IPOs. This was perhaps not surprising as 
there were over 400 IPOs alone from the second quarter of 1999 through the first quarter 
of 2000. Of these IPOs, over 70% were internet-related with over $33 billion dollars 
raised.  
                                                
11 On the other hand,  not all institutions avoided the internet sector. For example, from the $136  and $222 
million held in public equities and reported in 13-F filings by University of Chicago and Yale University, 
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One of the best known stylized facts in corporate finance is the underpricing of IPOs. 
For example, Loughran and Ritter (2001) document a 14% first-day return over the 1990-
1998 period. The factual nature of this result cannot be questioned as studies in other 
sample periods and across other markets report similar findings. For example, an update 
of Loughran, Ritter and Rydqvist (1994) shows that, in all 38 countries looked at, the 
first-day return is on average positive. A number of explanations have been posited for 
why underpricing persists. Perhaps, the most respected rational explanation is the 
winner’s curse due to Rock (1986)  which argues that underpricing needs to take place to 
induce uninformed investors into the market. Alternatively, underpricing might result 
from irrational behavior on the part of investors who tend to overreact to the IPO. 
Underwriters price the IPO based on its “true” or long-run value – hence, the 
underpricing phenomenon. Recently, Loughran and Ritter (2001) argue instead that some 
issuers prefer underpricing the IPO because they care more about the change in  wealth 
than its level, i.e., prospect theory of choice (Kahneman and Tversky (1979)). 
Table 5A reports the underpricing of internet and non-internet IPOs over the January 
1998 to February 2000 sample period. The most striking result is that the mean first-day 
return on internet IPOs is 95.5% with consistently high returns irrespective of whether the 
year was 1998, 1999, or 2000. Moreover, the median is 63.1%, which is relatively high 
given the aforementioned 14% average return documented in Loughran and Ritter (2001). 
In fact, from 1975 to 1997, the largest average in any of the years was 21.2% (in 1995).  
As an example, from the first quarter of 1999 through the first quarter of 2000, 146 IPO 
issues doubled in price on the first day of trading. In contrast, over the two decades from 
1975-1997, this effect occurred for only a handful of the 6,500 or so IPOs. Table 5A also 
documents the mean and median returns of non-internet IPOs over the 1998 to 2000 
period, namely 33.6% and 10.4%, respectively.12 The difference between the internet and 
non-internet sample is strongly significant from a statistical viewpoint. 
                                                                                                                                            
26% and 52% were respectively invested in our sample of internet firms. 
12 The 33.6% mean (though not the median) for non-internet firms is greater in magnitude than previous 
years. It should be noted that this non-internet sample includes a number of high technology firms that 
many might consider internet-based. For example, the largest one-day return (e.g., 697%) over the sample 
is achieved by VA Linux systems, which is the provider of Linux-based computer systems and services. 
Most analysts would consider their business being driven by internet-based applications; however, in our 
breakdown based on the criteria for inclusion, VA Linux is part of the non-internet sample. 
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These large first-day returns are consistent with a sudden shift towards optimistic 
investors. However, alternatively, perhaps the first day close reflected the “fundamental” 
value of the stock, and issuers were leaving more money on the table. An anecdotal 
example suggests this may not be the case. On December 7, 1999 Andover.net completed 
an IPO at a public offering of $18. This IPO was unique in that it was performed online 
via WR Hambrecht’s OpenIPO system, which is a uniform price sealed-bid auction 
conducted over the internet. The auction is open to all investors and resulted in a market 
clearing price of $24. The company, however, elected to stay within their cited range and 
priced the deal at $18 (i.e., a 25% underpricing). During the first day of trading, however, 
Andover.net’s price jumped to $63.38, which represented a 164% premium to the auction 
clearing price that these investors could have achieved the previous night and a 250% 
premium to the issuer’s price. What information arrived during the night that would 
increase Andover.net’s value by 164%, or why investors chose not to participate in the 
OpenIPO system even though it was highly publicized, brings into question the 
rationality of the investors who did purchase Andover.net on December 8.13 
To explore the IPO underpricing explanations in a more formal way, we performed 
two tests. These test results are reported in Table 5B. The first test looks at the relation 
between the previous three weeks’ return on the internet index and the IPO underpricing. 
Consistent with other studies, the relation is positive, which supports the idea that not all 
public information gets incorporated into the IPO price. While consistent with the 
prospect theory of Loughran and Ritter (2001), it does not necessarily refute our 
explanation of the first day return as only a portion of that return is explained by the 
public information measure. Therefore, the second test examines the relation between the 
first day return and the cumulative excess return (relative to the internet index) from the 
close of the IPO’s first day to the end of 2000. Similar to existing studies, a first pass at 
the data shows little relation, which would tend to contradict our hypothesis or imply that 
investors were equally “overreacting” to the IPO in December 2000 as on the IPO day.14 
                                                
13 It is possible that Andover.net was a unique event in that there had been few IPO auctions leading up to 
this IPO, and most of the previous ones had resulted in small first day run-ups. Even if investors had 
expected the IPO price to remain flat, however, this does not explain why investors changed their mind and 
decided to pay significantly more the next day. 
14 DuCharme, Rajgopal, and Sefcik (2001) look at the IPO underpricing phenomenon specific to internet 
firms and report a similar result. They also explore several hypotheses in more detail, including (i) media 
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However, as the median estimates show in Table 5A, the first-day returns are skewed. If 
we truncate the data to look at only the larger first day returns (e.g., 40% of the sample 
have 100% plus returns) with the motivation that these are the ones with significant 
shifts, the results change dramatically. In particular, Table 5B shows a strongly negative 
relation between future excess returns on stocks and their IPO first day return with a 
coefficient of -.44 and t-statistic of 2.73.15   
 
B. The IPO – the quiet period 
 
The above results for the first day of the IPO are simultaneously consistent with (i) 
inflated internet prices, and (ii) heterogeneity, or, in this case, new investors entering the 
market. What other IPO-related events can be linked to a shift towards retail investors?  
         At an IPO, there is generally a syndicate of investment banks that underwrite the 
shares and then sell them to the public. The top tiers of the syndicate, the lead and senior 
co-managers, tend to provide research on the company to the financial community. 
According to rules of the SEC, during a 25-day Quiet Period after the IPO, the 
underwriters and the company must remain silent with respect to the company’s financial 
prospects. This practically means that the underwriters cannot publish research and that 
the company cannot give forecasts and must maintain a relatively “low” public profile 
(outside of hard news). The SEC’s motivation behind this rule is to prevent “hyping” of 
the stock during the initial days of the IPO. As a byproduct of this rule, almost invariably 
at the end of the quiet period, the top tiers of the syndicate release their research reports 
on the company. Not surprisingly, the research tends to be very favorable since the 
investment bank originally espoused this opinion during the registration process. The 
quiet period end is thought to be associated with positive, though not unexpected, 
research reports from the underwriters (often called “booster shots”). If an overly 
optimistic investor is characterized by someone who basically ignores public information, 
then one manifestation of this optimism might be the belief that this news from the 
                                                                                                                                            
hype, (ii) desire for follow-on offerings, and (iii) the IPO as a branding event. They find evidence that 
supports the media hype hypothesis to the extent that underpricing increases with media exposure. This is 
consistent with overoptimism on the part of investors entering the IPO market. 
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research report is new. In fact, “wall street folklore” is that retail investors buy these 
shares from institutional investors on the release of these positive research reports. 
Because institutions know this will happen, they tend to buy, and therefore bid up the 
price of the shares, in the preceding days.  
Nevertheless, the importance of the research reports is irrelevant for whether prices 
rationally incorporate the quiet period. The key implication is that because the event date 
is known, there should be no price response on average around that date. If there is on 
average a directional move, investors should have incorporated that move into the stock 
price when it first trades. This is because the event itself is completely anticipated; that is, 
it is public information that the quiet period lasts 25 days for all companies following an 
IPO. In fact, during this period, there were IPO-related websites which provided the exact 
timing.  
 Table 6 reports average daily and cumulative abnormal returns for the internet IPO 
sample leading up to the end of the quiet period. The abnormal returns are calculated by 
taking the firm’s return minus the return on the index of internet stocks.16 The daily 
returns are all positive for the last ten days of the quiet period, with a cumulative effect of 
13% and a corresponding t-statistic of 7.99. This 13% excess return is completely 
predictable because the end of the quiet period is a known and anticipated event. In 
contrast, we took a sample of non-internet related firms for the period prior to 1998 from 
Ofek and Richardson (2000) and still find a positive effect which suggests this anomaly 
has been persistent and is not purely internet-related. However, the effect is 3.5%, which 
is about one-fourth the magnitude of our internet sample. As mentioned earlier, there is 
evidence that the internet has a greater fraction of retail investors. Thus, if one takes the 
view that retail investors were more optimistic than institutional investors, one might 
consider the internet sector as being more prone to the quiet period trading anomaly, thus 
explaining the 9.5% differential. 
Along with providing the CAR for the sample of firms, Figure 5 also graphs the daily 
volume. The average daily volume around the end of the quiet period (i.e., the prior day, 
                                                                                                                                            
15 A similar truncation for a sample of noninternet firms shows a slightly positive, though insignificant, 
relation. 
16 The results are robust to other indices and methods such as the Nasdaq composite and market model, 
respectively. 
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day of, and next day) is 60% higher, which is consistent with increased buying of the 
firm’s shares on the release of the underwriter’s research report. While this fact alone 
does not mean there is a shift in the heterogeneity of investors during this period, it is 
consistent with that story. Moreover, the daily average volume is around $25 million 
which also suggests that a large portion of the 13% is predictable profit, that is, 
considerable amounts of trading can be completed at the prevailing market prices. 
      While the 9.5% differential between internet and non-internet stocks, and the 
higher volume, can be explained by the increased presence of retail investors, it is still a 
puzzle why the inefficiency exists in the first place. Rational investors should have priced 
the inefficiency away thereby immediately incorporating the effect into the opening price 
on the IPO day. The fact this does not happen suggests a degree of irrationality beyond 
that covered in this paper.  
 
VI. The Limited Ability to Short Internet Stocks 
 
Section 5 above provided some evidence that internet stocks were held by a greater 
fraction of retail investors, and that, when shifts towards retail investors occurred, the 
price effects are in the right direction. While these results are consistent with our model, 
there is the additional requirement that pessimistic, or arguably realistic, investors were 
prevented from shorting these stocks. If one takes the view that there is considerable 
amounts of “rational” capital in the marketplace, the question remains why was not the 
capital deployed against the internet sector. There are two possible reasons why 
pessimistic investors did not short stocks sufficiently to offset the optimistic investors: 
either investors could not or were unwilling to short stock (at least up to some point). 17  
Before presenting the empirical work on shorting stocks, it is worthwhile discussing 
whether capital was limited or not. Who are these pessimistic investors? Obvious 
potential candidates are institutions, and in particular, mutual funds (aside from pure 
internet funds or index funds) and hedge funds. 
                                                
17 This ignores the earlier point that, in a framework consistent with a rational bubble,  pessimistic investors 
might buy internet stocks to take advantage of other investors’ beliefs. 
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As pointed out by Chen, Hong and Stein (2000), among others, mutual funds are 
reluctant to short stocks. While this may be more a reflection of previous outdated 
legislation, such as the Investment Company Act of 1940, than anything real, it is 
relevant if mutual funds still abide by it. They cite work that shows only a small fraction 
(2%) of mutual funds short stocks, and provide evidence of greater mispricings when 
mutual funds are absent from the market. Their argument is that, due to an unwillingness 
to short,  institutions tend to avoid “overvalued” stocks. Thus, lower breadth is consistent 
with a stock being overvalued. Interestingly, here, as shown in Table 4B, pension funds 
were very much absent from the internet sector, which is consistent with this explanation. 
With respect to hedge funds, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) argue that, in practice, 
arbitrage is neither capital-free nor riskless. In a model in which arbitrageurs require 
capital from outside investors and is performance-based, they show that arbitrage may 
not be successful at forcing asset prices back to their fundamentals. They then 
hypothesize that fundamental valuation is most flawed in the presence of highly volatile 
settings. Clearly, as the volatility results in Table 1B show, the prices of internet stocks 
and their corresponding mispricing occurred in an extraordinarily volatile period. Thus, 
on some level, the internet sector satisfies the Shleifer and Vishny (1997) conditions. On 
the other hand, while this arbitrage is risky, a diversified portfolio across all assets would 
expose the trader to only the systematic risk of internet stocks. If, within a portfolio of 
assets, the risk of internet stocks represents purely idiosyncratic risk, then why would the 
capital be considered risky? 
         Hedge funds often face convex payout schemes. From the hedge fund’s point of 
view, the positive skewness of internet stock returns is a negative characteristic to have in 
one’s portfolio. The positive skewness is transparent from Table 1B which implies an 
annualized volatility  of 115% for internet-related firms. As an illustration of the 
distribution of returns facing hedge funds during this period, Figure 6 graphs the cross-
sectional distribution of the maximum return over any month (i.e., 22-day rolling period 
return) for internet and non-internet firms over the January 1999 to February 2000 time 
period. Figure 6 shows that over 90% of the internet firms had a maximum monthly 
return of 80% plus over this yearly period. Thus, even if investors thought internet stocks 
were overvalued, there was a large probability over this year that a short position would 
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be down considerably at some point in time. Thus, short positions might produce on 
average excess profits but with a substantial risk of an extreme loss. These maximum 
returns did not all occur at the same time,  so diversification would somewhat reduce the 
risk over any given period. However, over this same sample period, an equally-weighted 
portfolio of the internet stocks had a maximum monthly return of 64%. Thus, even a 
well-diversified portfolio of short positions would be subject to the same problems. 
Even if we assume that there was willing capital, it still does not follow that it was 
possible to short internet stocks sufficient to bring the prices back down. As discussed 
below in some detail, the ability to short on infinitum is practically impossible. 
Empirically, we show below that (i) internet stocks were in fact substantially more short 
relative to  “old economy” stocks, and (ii) internet stocks were at a saturation point in 
terms of the ability to short more.  
 
 
      A.        Short Interest in the Internet Sector  
 
Table7a reports the amount of short interest in internet stocks relative to the universe 
of stocks in February 2000.  Short interest here is defined as the total amount of shares of 
stock that have been sold short relative to the total amount of shares outstanding. As seen 
from the table, short interest was considerably higher for internet stocks than their 
corresponding “old economy” counterparts. For example, the short interest measures are 
2.8%  versus 1.8% for the mean and 1.6% versus 0.7% for the median respectively. Thus, 
short interest is double that of the typical company in the non-internet universe. In 
addition, across the distribution of short interest in the universe of stocks, the 90th and 
95th percentiles are considerably larger for the internet sample (i.e., 6.9% and 10.6% 
versus 4.7% and 7.8%, respectively). 
The results from Table 7a probably understate the results to a very large degree. 
There are two characteristics of the internet firms that are relatively unique. First, internet 
firms tend to have many insiders, not least because they represent startup businesses. 
Insiders’ shares are usually restricted from sales either directly through the company’s 
prospectus for a set number of years or implicitly through indirect pressure. Second, for a 
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period usually of six months duration, the majority of shares are locked up after a firm’s 
IPO. Since the sample includes a substantial number of firms during their IPO lockup 
period, the number of shares available for trading is much less. Thus, the number of 
shares outstanding is dramatically overstated relative to the number of shares floating, 
which suggests that short interest is of a magnitude higher than implied by Table 7a. 
 In order to generate some evidence on this latter claim, Table 7a look at short interest 
in the internet sector pre- and post-lockup. The short interest is approximately three times 
higher (and statistically significant) in the post-lockup period, which gives support for the 
internet sector having an even greater amount of short interest relative to non-internet 
stocks. Moreover, Table 7b provides the correlation between short interest and the age of 
the internet firm. As predicted, the correlation is positive, i.e., 0.25, and statistically 
significant at the 1% level. 
 
B.         The Limited Ability to Short Stocks 
 
The discussion in (A) above implies restrictions on the amount of shares that can be 
traded. This immediately limits the amount of shorting that can take place. However, 
there are a number of other reasons why shorting stocks may be difficult in practice. 
First, in order to short a stock, the investor must be able to borrow it. As mentioned 
above, there were only a limited number of shares available for trading in internet stocks, 
and someone (i.e., institution or individual) would have to be willing to lend the shares. 
For whatever reason, individuals tend to lend shares less than institutions do. Since many 
of the investors in internet stocks were individuals (e.g., Table 4A), this reduced on the 
margin the supply of shares that could be shorted. Second, there is no guarantee that the 
short position would not get called either through the lenders demanding it back or 
margin calls. It is not a 100% probability that the investor would be able to re-short the 
stock.  
While there are anecdotal stories about the difficulty in shorting internet stocks, it 
would be useful to gather some hard evidence of this from the data. In particular, when an 
investor shorts a stock (i.e., the borrower), he must place a cash deposit equal to the 
proceeds of the shorted stock. That  deposit carries an interest rate referred to as the rebate 
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rate. When there is ample supply of shares to short, the rebate closely reflects the 
prevailing interest rate. However, when supply is tight, the rebate rate will be lower. This 
lower rate reflects compensation to the lender of the stock at the expense of the borrower, 
and thus can provide a mechanism for evening out demand and supply in the market. 
A financial institution, and one of the largest dealer-brokers, provided us its 
proprietary rebate rates for the universe of stocks on a selected number of dates. Table 7a 
documents the rebate rate across internet stocks versus the entire universe of stocks. The 
average rebate rate is approximately 1.08% less for internet stocks than other stocks.  
Moreover, the median difference is 1.45% which is strongly statistically significant. 
While it is difficult to know what this means precisely about the ability to short on the 
margin, it is clear evidence that shorting was more difficult for internet stocks.18 An 
additional way to make this point is to note that 46% of the internet stocks lie in the 10% 
tail of all rebate rates. In fact, the mean rebate rate on internet stocks would represent the 
8th percentile of the non-internet distribution. Thus, to the extent shorting is limited in 
practice, and assuming the rebate rate maps one-to-one with this limitation, the majority 
of internet stocks had reached a limit in their short positions.19  
Table 7B provides additional evidence on the relation between the rebate rate and the 
difficulty in short-selling. First, Table 7b documents the correlation between short 
interest and the rebate rate. As one might expect, the correlation is significant and 
negative. That is, the higher the short interest, the lower the rebate rate, and presumably 
the more difficult to find significant number of stocks to short sell. Second, Table 7b 
provides the cross-sectional correlation between the implied P/E ratios of each stock 
(e.g., Figure 4) and the rebate rate. If a higher implied P/E signals a more overvalued 
internet stock, then the rebate rate should be lower as short selling will be at its saturation 
                                                
18 For example, along with receiving a lower rate on their cash proceeds, the short investors (i) may also 
face a higher risk of having their shorts called, and (ii) there is no guarantee one can find a substantial 
amount of stock to short at these rates. Mitchell, Pulvino and Stafford (2001) look at the minimum rebate 
rate for subsidiaries resulting from carve-out transactions. Their findings support ours in that they 
document substantially lower rebate rates. They view their findings, however, somewhat differently and 
argue that the rates are not low enough to explain the available arbitrages. Our interpretation of the rebate 
rate is more in terms of what it says about the difficulty in shorting than a literal view. In a comprehensive 
paper on the equity lending market, Geczy, Musto and Reed (2001) reach a similar conclusion. Though 
their paper is not about internet stocks per se, their results are consistent with the view advocated here. (See 
also Jones and Lamont (2001)). 
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point from the trading of pessimistic investors. As expected, the correlation is significant 
at the 1% level and economically meaningful, i.e., -0.16.  
If investors are limited by how many shares they can short, however, there are other 
ways to bet against the stock. For example, one could imagine setting up a synthetic short 
position using the options market. Figlewski and Webb (1993) and Lamont and Thaler 
(2000) look at this case empirically. Even if the options market was run by pessimistic 
traders, we would expect to see violations of put-call parity as arbitrage is violated due to 
short sale restrictions and the high valuation of stocks. There would be excess demand for 
put options relative to call options, leaving a significant spread between the prices. 
Lamont and Thaler (2000) show that, in the Palm/3Com case, the synthetic short for Palm 
(i.e., its implied value from options) was substantially lower than the traded price of 
Palm, e.g., approximately 30% less during the first few weeks. This is consistent with the 
equity prices reflecting one set of beliefs with the options market reflecting another set. 
 
 
VII.  The Bubble Bursts: Effects of the Lock-Up Period 
 
 Why did the so-called internet bubble burst? For our model to be consistent with 
the Internet stock price fall in March 2000, we can think of two possibilities. First, 
perhaps fundamental news came out about internet stocks that shocked the beliefs of the 
optimistic investors. While this is possible, we could find no particular single event that 
could have caused the drop.20 Second, in spite of the analysis in Section 6, perhaps 
pessimistic investors could all of a sudden short considerable amounts of internet stocks. 
At face value, this would not seem to be a credible explanation. Why, for example, in the 
Spring of 2000 was shorting more easy to do than at other times? 
We believe, however, that there is evidence to support this latter explanation once we 
realize that shorting stocks and selling stocks have the same economic effect. In 
                                                                                                                                            
19 As evident from Table 7A, this limit applies to firms both pre- and post-lockup because the distribution 
of rebate rates for both subsamples are similar. 
20 This is not to state that no news came out. For example, on March 27, 2000, CDNow’s public accountant 
expressed “substantial doubt” about CDNow’s ability to continue as a going concern. Interestingly, in just 
the previous month, CDNow had attracted the most buyers of any ecommerce firm, including 
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particular, towards the latter part of 1999 and particularly Spring 2000, there was a large 
number of investors – insiders, venture capitalists, institutions and sophisticated investors 
– who were free to sell their internet shares (through the unwinding of their lockup 
agreements). To the extent these investors did not have the same optimism about payoffs 
that existing investors had, their beliefs would now get incorporated into stock prices. As 
the amount of potential selling increased, this new class of investors (whether they were 
pessimistic or agnostic) began to overwhelm the optimistic ones. 
To understand this story more fully, note that in an IPO, the existing shareholders 
rarely sell the entire company. Instead, approximately 15-20% of the shares are issued to 
the public. Though not a legal requirement, it is a standard arrangement for the 
underwriters to insist upon the shares of the remaining 80-85% shareholders to be 
restricted from sale for a certain period of time without the express written consent of the 
underwriter. This period, the so-called lock-up period, is one way of aligning the 
incentives of the current owners and new owners, at least during the initial stages of the 
company being public. There are no rules regarding the length of the lock-up period; 
however, the majority of lock-up periods last 180 days, or approximately 6 months, and 
are spelled out in the prospectus. Upon completion of this period, these shareholders are 
then free to sell their existing shares. Thus, there is a completely observable event which 
results in (i) a permanent shift in the amount of available shares in the marketplace, (ii) a 
shift in the class of investors who may have different beliefs than the current marginal 
investors, and (iii) this new class are potential sellers (as there is no restriction on their 
buying shares outside of their desire to be diversified). 
Figure 7 graphs both the dollar amount of shares being unlocked by month and the 
cumulative effect over the sample period January 1998 to September 2000.21 The results 
are quite striking. By late Spring of 2000, over $300 billion of shares had been unlocked. 
As these shares become unlocked, and eventually sold, there must be sufficient capital on 
the other side to support the internet price levels. Because these levels are not justified via 
their cash flow fundamentals, this new capital must come from a new source of optimistic 
                                                                                                                                            
Amazon.com. Thus, on one level, this news represented clear evidence that internet success was not 
necessarily linked to a firm’s profits and therefore its value. 
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investors. Thus, to the extent some of the $300 billion in capital was owned by less 
optimistic investors than the marginal investor, prices should drop as this huge amount of 
capital works its way through the market.22 
A comparison of Figure 1, the internet stock price history, and Figure 7 is 
illuminating. From November 1, 1999 to April 30, 2000 the amount of unlocked shares 
increased from $70 billion to $270 billion. What happened to the level of internet stock 
prices over this same period? As Figure 1 shows, from November 30, 1998 to November 
30, 1999, the internet index rose from 200 to 830. If this rise was due to optimism about 
the future payoffs of the stocks, and, in particular, due to a belief about future prices 
(absent fundamentals), the rise is consistent with the self-fulfilling properties of a bubble. 
While the index still rose over the next several months, it did so at a much slower rate. 
Perhaps, the slowdown in the rise of internet prices may have been due to the beginnings 
of less optimistic investors selling their unlocked shares. As prices stopped rising, 
optimistic investors’ “bubble-like” beliefs about future prices were also affected, leading 
to a twofold effect on internet prices. The fall of the index from 1030 to 430 from March 
1 to April 30, 2000 coincides with the simultaneous increase in unlocked shares. Once the 
bubble had burst, there was no longer support as optimistic investors’ beliefs had been 
permanently altered. 
 Although this explanation is circumstantial, it provides a cohesive explanation of the 
internet stock price fall in the context of the model of Section 2. Unfortunately, we 
cannot prove this hypothesis definitively, mostly because the unwinding of lockup 
agreements is a gradual process. Nevertheless, to support this hypothesis, we turn to 
evidence of internet stock price performance around both short and long windows of 
lockup expirations. 
Because the end of the lock-up period is a known event, markets should incorporate 
the economic impact (if any) of either price pressure or permanent shocks to share 
supply. In other words, the price impact should be built into the IPO traded price long 
                                                                                                                                            
21 The cumulative effect is simply the addition of the dollar value of the shares at lockup expiration; thus, 
the cumulative effect does not make any adjustments for change in value of the shares after the lockup 
expiration. 
22 This problem is actually magnified as the firms themselves are issuing (i.e., selling) additional shares. 
Though not reported in the Tables, from November 1999 to February 2000, an additional $9.2 and $16.4  
billion of capital were issued in IPOs and seasoned offerings, respectively. 
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before the end of the lock-up period. From our perspective, the lockup adds a 
considerable number of potential sellers to the market, some of which may be less 
optimistic than the current marginal investor. Thus, if there is heterogeneity across 
investors and short sale restrictions, then we would expect a drop in internet stock prices 
around the event. 
Table 9 reports average daily and cumulative abnormal returns for the internet IPO 
sample leading up to the end of the lockup period. The abnormal returns are calculated by 
taking the firm’s return minus the return on the index of internet stocks. The daily returns 
are mostly negative for the last ten days of the lockup period, with a cumulative effect of 
4.5% and corresponding t-statistics around 4.23 This is larger in magnitude than the range 
of 1-2% reported in existing studies for non-internet companies. Because the end of the 
lockup period is a known and anticipated event, however, the 4.5% average excess return 
is not consistent with market rationality. Nevertheless, the increase in magnitude is 
consistent with the hypothesis that the price drop is due to less optimistic investors being 
allowed to sell in the market.24  
 Figure 8 provides a graph of the CAR and the average daily volume around the 
lockup period. Some additional observations are of interest. First, even prior to the 10-
day window  and post the lockup end, there tends to be a gradual drift down in the prices 
of these firms (i.e., approximately 10%). We hypothesize that this may be due to the 
gradual shift towards pessimistic investors. Consistent with this hypothesis is the fact that 
this continued drop post-lockup is not found in previous studies of lockups for non-
internet firms. Second, there is a large jump in volume at the lock-up end, and, though 
this volume drops thereafter, it remains above the pre-lockup period.  While this result is 
the same for non-internet companies, the magnitude of the volume increase on and after 
the lockup day is higher than previously reported. This may also be due to the increased 
number of sellers due to their skepticism about internet prices. 
                                                
23 Recently, a number of papers have explored the lock-up period (e.g., Bradley, Jordan, Rotan and Yi 
(1999), Brav and Gompers (2000), Field and Hanka (2000) and Ofek and Richardson (2000).) While the 
focus of these papers are different, they all report similar price (-1.0-2.0%) and volume effects (35-45%) 
around the end of the lock-up period over different time periods.  
24 Alternatively, it is also could be due to price pressure from non-diversified investors wishing to sell  their 
stakes for reasons independent of their beliefs. Since the price drop is permanent, however, this explanation 
is suspect. 
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 The decline in internet stock prices around the lockup expiration is consistent with 
the model, i.e., the introduction of sellers to the market causing prices to drop. However, 
our analysis follows a short event-study window, while our explanation suggests 
continued selling and longer-term effects. Table 9A documents the difference between 
excess returns on internet stocks over six month periods pre- and post-lockup expiration, 
excluding the previously documented days –10 to +2. The idea of this analysis is that the 
six-month post-lockup period is a long enough interval to allow the “pessimistic” investor 
to sell out of their position, and the comparison to the pre-lockup period controls for the 
actual inability to sell. The difference is  –0.23% on a daily basis (or –28.8% on a six 
months basis) over the sample period prior to the crash of March 2000. Put together, the 
5.5% decline around the lockup period and the 28.8% relative decline post lockup 
suggests over a one-third reduction in excess returns due to lockup expirations in a period 
dominated by optimistic investors. 
 In contrast, post crash, the –0.23% difference disappears and is actually a positive 
0.07% though not statistically significant. At first glance, this result might seem counter 
to the theory.  However, if the crash already caused the distribution of investors to 
change, or, as we argued earlier in the paper, the optimistic investors to lose their 
“bubble-like” beliefs, then we would not expect any difference. As limited evidence for 
this explanation, Table 9B shows that the correlations of the relevant internet stocks and 
the internet index are higher post-crash than pre-crash. That is, irrespective of whether 
their lockups have expired, stocks tend to move closer together after the internet price 
fall. This is consistent with greater homogeneity in investors after the crash. 
 
VIII. Concluding Remarks 
 
This paper looks at the behavior of internet stock prices during the extraordinary asset 
pricing period January 1998 to February 2000. Three immediate facts emerge from a 
simple cursory analysis: (i) relative to the aggregate market, internet stock prices rose to 
high levels (Figure 1), (ii) even given these high stock price levels, volume of pure 
internet stocks was even higher, reaching 20% of the aggregate market (Figure 3), and 
(iii) there was a greater proportion of retail investors to institutional ones in the internet 
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versus non-internet sector (Table 4). With this backdrop, and at least the conditions for 
the market being “stormed” by retail investors,  we appeal to a model of heterogenous 
agents with varying degrees of beliefs about asset payoffs who are subject to short sales 
constraints (e.g., Lintner (1969)). 
 In this framework, if a set of investors enter the market, or all of a sudden become 
very optimistic, then stock prices can rise quite dramatically. “Pessimistic” investors 
would like to short these “overvalued” stocks but are prevented from doing so. Here, as 
more and more “optimistic” investors arrive to the market, it becomes a stampede without 
any initial way of stopping it. We provide circumstantial support for this explanation 
through the following pieces of evidence: (i) internet stock price levels that are much 
higher than implied by historical valuation metrics, (ii) price effects consistent with the 
explanation when there is a shift in the type of investors entering the market (e.g., as with 
IPO-related anomalies), (iii) empirical results demonstrating that shorting was at its 
maximum possible level for internet stocks, and (iv) the eventual fall, or bubble bursting, 
of internet stocks can be tied to the increase in the number of sellers to the market via 
expiration of lockup agreements. 
 There are several directions for future research. First, we have provided one 
potential explanation for the rise, persistence and eventual fall of internet stock prices. 
While there are clearly explanations for the individual pieces of evidence presented in 
this paper, we believe it will be a challenge for financial economists to come up with an 
alternative story that fits all the pieces. Second, our paper has focused on the level of 
prices and ignored the relative volatility differences between internet and non-internet 
stocks. Results in Table 1B, for example, show that internet stocks were 5.9  times more 
variable, yet had 37.5% lower spreads. The magnitude of this volatility needs to be 
integrated into a full explanation of the internet rise and fall. Third, rational investors had 
access to derivatives during this period, e.g., index futures and equity options, and could 
have used these financial assets to bet against internet movements. A full analysis of 
whether this occurred, and, if not, why not, seems relevant for a complete understanding 
of the way capital markets behaved during the 1998-2000 period. In any event, this paper 
provides a first step at generating a complete, cohesive explanation of the internet bubble. 
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Table 1A 
 
Internet sub-sectors and “old economy” match 
 
A description of internet sub-industries and their mapping to non-internet industries.  For 
each sub-industry we report the total number firms and the total number of firms with 
Compustat data for fiscal year 1999. 
 
 
Industry 
Code Internet Industry Description 
Number of 
firms 
Firms with 
12/99 data Industry 
1 Internet Portal Companies 24 15 Media 
2 Internet Infrastructure Companies 34 22 Computer Hardware 
3 Internet Infrastructure Services 74 47 Computer Software 
4 Internet/B2B Software Companies 54 28 Information Services 
5 Internet Commerce Companies 50 32 Specialty Retail 
6 Internet Consulting/Application Services 50 38 Information Services 
7 Internet Financial Services Companies 23 19 Financial Services 
8 Multi-Sector Internet Companies 2 2 Information Services 
9 Internet Vertical Portal Companies 48 39 Publishing 
10 Internet Direct Marketing & Advertising 26 18 Information Services 
11 Internet B2B Commerce Companies 15 6 Information Services 
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Table 1B 
 
Sample description 
 
Descriptive statistic of a sample of 320 internet firms and 3861 non-internet firms as of 
2/29/2000.   Average daily return is for the period 1/1998-2/2000.  The information for 
internet firms is reported for the whole sub-sample and for 267 internet firms with price > 
$10 on that date. 
 
Variable  Internet  Sample   Mean   Median   STD   Low   High 
Market value of No P>10          5,111              599        22,248                1        461,177 
      equity ($ mil) Yes P>10          4,495           1,323        11,131              48        131,755 
  Yes All          3,801              977        10,294              20        131,755 
Stock price No P>10 33.97 22.00 39.61 5.38 1100.00 
 Yes P>10 65.96 46.38 62.56 9.56 322.44 
  Yes All 56.23 35.06 61.19 2.50 322.44 
Median daily volume No P>10        24,988           2,321      128,355                1     3,392,355 
   previous 100 days ($ mil) Yes P>10        78,558         16,419      169,774         1,023     1,204,647 
  Yes All        66,757         12,888      158,250                1     1,204,647 
Median shares-turnover No P>10 0.0078 0.0034 0.0140 0.0000 0.3554 
   previous 100 days Yes P>10 0.0148 0.0125 0.0097 0.0011 0.0519 
  Yes All 0.0146 0.0125 0.0094 0.0011 0.0519 
Average daily return No P>10 0.0019 0.0005 0.0046 -0.0291 0.0627 
Average daily return Yes P>10 0.0067 0.0060 0.0074 -0.0120 0.0375 
Daily Standard deviation of return No  0.0350 0.0300 0.0203 0.0034 0.3952 
 Yes  0.0742 0.0728 0.0218 0.0135 0.2078 
  Diff   0.0392 a 0.0428 a       
Bid ask spread $ No P>10 0.610 0.188 16.250 0.000 1000 
 Yes P>10 0.348 0.188 0.411 0.063 3 
  Diff   -0.2613 0.0000       
Bid ask spread/Mid price No P>10 0.013 0.008 0.031 0.000 1.645 
 Yes P>10 0.007 0.005 0.007 0.000 0.058 
  Diff   -0.0055 a -0.0023 a       
 
a - Significant at the 1% level 
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Table 2 
Aggregate financial information and target P/E 
A description of aggregate sales, market value of equity, EBITDA and earnings for 
internet firms with 1999 Financial data available on Compustat.  Target earnings are 
calculated by multiplying the average Earnings/Sales ratio for all firms in the matching 
non-internet industry by aggregate sales for that internet sub-industry.  Target P/E is 
Aggregate market cap/ target earnings. 
 
 
Industry 
Code 
Aggregate 
Market cap 
Aggregate 
sales 
Aggregate 
EBITD 
Agg.Net 
Income 
Industry 
margins 
Target 
earnings 
Target 
P/E 
All      942,967    27,429   (5,750)  (9,888) 0.0568         1,557  605 
1      284,565      6,090        404   (1,181) 0.0452            275  1035 
2      100,910      2,172          23          13  0.0474            103  980 
3      139,442      3,354   (1,562)  (2,846) 0.1169            392  356 
4        95,617      1,219      (328)     (457) 0.0436              53  1800 
5        72,675      4,459   (3,037)  (3,565) 0.0190              85  856 
6        62,697      3,038      (123)     (501) 0.0436            132  474 
7        30,968      3,658        270        (57) 0.0927            339  91 
8        53,620         192      (126)       394  0.0436                8  6400 
9        43,264      2,267      (871)  (1,054) 0.0558            127  342 
10        31,278         590      (289)     (390) 0.0436              26  1216 
11        27,931         390      (110)     (244) 0.0436              17  1643 
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Table 3 
Panel A 
Implied excess return on capital  
 
Implied excess return on capital (1+R*)/(1+R) for internet firms as of 12/1999, assuming 
they already have profitability of comparable established industry, (i.e,, P/E of 605) 
 
Years Terminal P/E levels 
 10 15 20 25 30 
10 50.7% 44.7% 40.6% 37.5% 35.0% 
15 31.5% 28.0% 25.5% 23.7% 22.2% 
20 22.8% 20.3% 18.6% 17.3% 16.2% 
25 17.8% 15.9% 14.6% 13.6% 12.8% 
30 14.7% 13.1% 12.0% 11.2% 10.5% 
 
Panel B 
Implied excess return on capital 
Implied growth rates g for internet firms as of 12/1999.  Assuming they already have 
profitability of comparable established industry, (i.e., P/E of 605), and that WACC=16% 
during the growth period. 
 
Years Terminal P/E levels 
 10 15 20 25 30 
10 74.8% 67.9% 63.1% 59.5% 56.6% 
15 52.5% 48.4% 45.6% 43.5% 41.7% 
20 42.4% 39.6% 37.6% 36.0% 34.8% 
25 36.7% 34.5% 32.9% 31.8% 30.8% 
30 33.0% 31.2% 30.0% 29.0% 28.2% 
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Table 4A 
Institutional holdings in internet firms 
 
Comparison of various measures of institutional holdings between 273 internet firms and 
3946 non-internet firms with stock price greater than $10.  The institutional holdings are 
from the quarter that ended on March 31 2000. 
 
 
Variable  Internet  Sample   Mean   Median   STD   Low   High 
Institutional holdings/shares outstanding No P>10 0.4056 0.4024 0.2571 0.0000 0.9987 
 Yes P>10 0.3133 0.2592 0.2141 0.0014 0.9851 
  Diff   -0.0923 a -0.1432 a       
Number of institutions No P>10 110 65 146 1 1219 
 Yes P>10 76 54 78 1 848 
  Diff   -35 a -11 a       
Institutional holdings/shares outstanding No IPOs 0.3542 0.3148 0.2383 0.0019 0.9856 
 Yes IPOs 0.2953 0.2412 0.2024 0.0014 0.9851 
  Diff   -0.0589 a -0.0736 b       
Number of institutions No IPOs 63 50 55 2 376 
 Yes IPOs 65 50 50 6 322 
  Diff   2.0 0.0       
 
 
a - Significant at the 1% level 
b - Significant at the 5% level 
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Table 4B 
Holdings by large pension funds 
 
Fraction of the largest pension fund holdings in internet and non-internet stock. These 
pension funds refer to ones identifiable via their 13-F filings and ranked by Pensions and 
Investments Magazine. The institutional holdings are from the quarter that ended on 
March 31 2000. Holdings are in millions. 
 
Name 
Internet 
holdings 
Non-internet 
holdings Internet weight 
California Public Employees Retirement Sys  $                 2,858  $               79,320 3.48% 
New York State Common Retirement Fund  $                 1,194  $               70,141 1.67% 
Teacher Retirement System of Texas  $                    863  $               61,745 1.38% 
California State Teachers' Retirement System  $                 2,201  $               57,159 3.71% 
The Regents of the University of California  $                    539  $               42,678 1.25% 
The State Teachers Retirement System of Ohio  $                    528  $               32,985 1.58% 
State Treasurer State of Michigan  $                    646  $               32,110 1.97% 
The Florida State Board of Administration  $                    998  $               30,871 3.13% 
State of Wisconsin Investment Board  $                    167  $               13,539 1.22% 
IBM Retirement Funds Equity  $                    295  $               12,446 2.32% 
Total holdings by pension funds  $             10,289  $          432,994  2.32% 
Total market capital  $       1,107,778   $     24,164,630  4.38% 
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Table 5 
Panel A 
First day returns description 
First day return for 305 internet IPOs and 746 non-internet IPOs between 1/1998-4/2000.  
 
Internet Year Obs Mean STD Median Q1 Q3 
Yes All 305 0.955 1.021 0.631 0.193 1.438 
Yes 1998 23 0.860 1.021 0.705 0.162 1.195 
Yes 1999 206 0.933 0.979 0.639 0.219 1.417 
Yes 2000 76 1.042 1.133 0.613 0.182 1.729 
No All 746 0.336 0.658 0.104 0.000 0.371 
No 1998 303 0.135 0.260 0.058 0.000 0.196 
No 1999 287 0.463 0.823 0.188 0.000 0.571 
No 2000 156 0.495 0.754 0.188 0.002 0.721 
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Table 5 continue 
Panel B 
Regressions analysis of the first day return of internet firms that went public between 
1/1998-4/2000.   In the first model the dependent variable is the first day return and the 
independent variable is the cumulative return of the internet index in the previous 15 
trading days.     In the second model the dependent variable is the cumulative excess 
return (relative to the internet index) of the IPO firm from the close of the first day until 
the end of 2000 the independent variable is the first day return.  Student t-statistic is in 
parenthesis. 
 
 
Intercept Coefficient Obs Adj R sq 
    
Model 1 - Day 1 return =a + b*last 15 day index return 
Full sample    
0.871 a 1.958 a 270 0.0956 
      (14.26)        (5.44)     
    
Model 2 - Cumulative excess return =a+b*day 1 return 
Full sample    
-0.456 a -0.060 270 0.0000 
    (4.11)     (0.65)     
    
Firms with day 1 return > 100%  
0.484 -0.438 a 94 0.0641 
   (1.33)    (2.73)     
 
 
a - Significant at the 1% level 
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Table 6 
Excess returns around the end of the quiet period 
 
The sample includes 305 internet IPOs between 1/1998-4/2000.  Window days measure 
the number of days over which the cumulative excess return is measured.  The excess 
return is the difference between the firm on the stock and the internet index. All window 
days end on the event day (day 0). 
 
 
Window 
days CAR t-stat Event day 
Excess 
return t-stat 
1 -0.007 -1.225 0 -0.0068 -1.225 
2 0.005 0.669 -1 0.0122 1.925 
3 0.038 3.927 -2 0.0331 5.614 
4 0.059 5.425 -3 0.0200 3.615 
5 0.072 6.076 -4 0.0136 2.725 
6 0.090 6.950 -5 0.0177 3.278 
7 0.102 7.284 -6 0.0125 1.912 
8 0.109 7.391 -7 0.0070 1.228 
9 0.121 7.772 -8 0.0115 2.166 
10 0.130 7.999 -9 0.0090 1.640 
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Table 7 
Short Interest and Rebate Rates for Internet Firms 
Panel A 
 
Comparison of various measures of short interest between 273 internet firms and 3946 
non-internet firms with stock price greater than $10.  Short interest data and the rebate 
rates are as of February 2000. 
 
   Internet Sample  Mean   Median   STD   p10/p90   p5/p95 
Short interest/shares outstanding No ALL 0.018 0.007 0.034 0.047 0.078 
Short interest/shares outstanding Yes ALL 0.028 0.016 0.034 0.069 0.106 
  Diff   -0.010 a -0.009 a       
Rebate rate on shorts % No ALL 5.407 5.660 1.034 5.080 3.590 
Rebate rate on shorts % Yes ALL 4.328 5.210 1.952 0.870 0.040 
  Diff   1.078 a 0.450 a       
Short interest/shares outstanding Yes Pre Lockup 0.015 0.007 0.021 0.042 0.058 
Short interest/shares outstanding Yes Post Lockup 0.034 0.022 0.037 0.076 0.112 
    Diff -0.019 a -0.016 a       
Rebate rate on shorts % Yes Pre Lockup 3.929 4.990 2.290 0.110 -0.180 
Rebate rate on shorts % Yes Post Lockup 4.538 5.250 1.718 1.640 0.210 
    Diff -0.608 b -0.260       
 
 
Panel B 
 
Correlation between various measures of short interest and firm characteristics for 273 
internet firms as February 2000.  Age is the number of months since the IPO until 
February 2000.  Implied P/E is the stock price scaled by steady state earnings (current 
revenues*profit margins of comparable old economy margins). 
 
  
Short 
interest/shares 
outstanding Rebate rate Age Implied PE 
Short interest/shares outstanding 1.000 -0.431a 0.252 a -0.045 
Rebate rate on shorts % -0.431 a 1.000 0.082 -0.161a 
Age 0.252 a 0.082 1.000 -0.092 
Implied PE -0.045 -0.161a -0.092 1.000 
 
 
a - Significant at the 1% level 
b - Significant at the 5% level 
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Table 8 
Excess returns around the end of the Lockup period 
 
The sample includes 305 internet IPOs between 1/1998-4/2000.  Window days measure 
the number of days over which the cumulative excess return is measured.  The excess 
return is the difference between the firm on the stock and the internet index. All window 
days end on the event day (day 0). 
 
 
Window 
days CAR t-stat Event day 
Excess 
return t-stat 
1 -0.009 -1.586 0 -0.0087 -1.586 
2 -0.019 -2.485 -1 -0.0085 -1.709 
3 -0.023 -2.845 -2 -0.0049 -0.990 
4 -0.031 -3.397 -3 -0.0077 -2.071 
5 -0.037 -3.828 -4 -0.0060 -1.470 
6 -0.043 -4.256 -5 -0.0057 -1.205 
7 -0.046 -4.213 -6 -0.0029 -0.636 
8 -0.039 -3.499 -7 0.0063 1.415 
9 -0.046 -3.902 -8 -0.0063 -1.376 
10 -0.043 -3.523 -9 0.0026 0.545 
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 Table 9 
Long horizon comparison of pre-and post-lockup excess returns 
 
Panel A 
 
Comparison of average daily excess returns between the 6 months pre- and 6 months 
post-lockup expiration periods for internet firms. The excess return is the difference 
between the firm on the stock and the internet index. (These excess returns exclude days 
–10 to +2 around the lockup expiration). 
 
 
  Daily excess return Observations 
Full period 1/1998-12/2000  
Post lockup expiration 0.07% 21291 
Pre lockup expiration 0.18% 25188 
Difference -0.11% c  
Pre-crash 1/1998-2/2000   
Post lockup expiration 0.01% 10063 
Pre lockup expiration 0.22% 19128 
Difference -0.23% a  
Post crash 3/2000-12/2000  
Post lockup expiration 0.12% 11228 
Pre lockup expiration 0.05% 6060 
Difference 0.07%  
 
 
Panel B 
 
Comparison of the correlation between the internet firms’ stock returns and the return on 
the internet index, pre- and post-crash. These periods cover 10 months from May 1999 
through February 29, 2000 (pre-crash), and 10 months from March 2000 through 
December 31, 2000 (post-cash). These firms must have at least 100 trading days during 
this period to be included in the sample. 
 
 
Period means median std low high 
Pre-crash correlations (5/1999-2/2000) 0.3552 0.3684 0.1460 -0.0368 0.6815 
Post-crash correlations  (3/2000-12/2000) 0.3988 0.4130 0.1761 -0.0240 0.7659 
Difference in correlations -0.0437 a -0.0446 a       
 
a - Significant at the 1% level 
c - Significant at the 10% level 
Figure 1
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Fraction of internet firms in total market volume and capitalization
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Figure 4
Histogram and cumulative frequency implied PE ratios of internet firms at 
the end of 1999
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Frequency distribution of maximum 22 day return from 1/1/1999-2/29/2000
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Figure 8
Excess returns relative to Lockup expiration day
Internet firms 1/1998-2/2000
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